

## Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 03943 01 OF 03 252244Z

73

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-03 INR-07 L-03 ACDA-05

NSAE-00 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 USIA-06 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 H-02

OC-05 CCO-00 OCL-00 /049 W  
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R 251915Z JUL 75

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2890

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 3943

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO, 57

SUBJECT: IMS STUDY OF TURKISH CONCERNS : COMMUNICATIONS, AIR  
DEFENSE, OVERFLIGHTS, EXERCISES

REF: A. STATE 171726

B. USNATO 3051

C. USNATO 3238

1. HERE FOLLOWS TEXT OF A PERSONAL MEMO FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL REPORTING ON AN IMS STUDY OF TURKISH CONCERNS ARISING FROM GREEK ACTIONS THAT AFFECT TURKISH MILITARY COOPERATION WITH NATO. THESE CONCERNS , WHICH WERE EXPRESSED BY TURKISH AMBASSADOR ERALP AT THE APRIL 25 DPC MEETING, INCLUDE COMMUNICATIONS, REGIONAL AIR DEFENSE, OVERFLIGHTS, NATO EXERCISES, AND POSSIBLE CONTINGENCY PLANS IN THE EVENT OF COMPLETE GREEK WITHDRAWAL FROM NATO'S INTEGRATED MILITARY STRUCTURE.

2. THE PRELIMINARY TECHNICAL EXAMINATION OF THESE ISSUES IN THE IMS PROVIDES A USEFUL SURVEY OF THESE AREAS OF TURKISH CONCERN. HOWEVER, NEITHER THE STUDY NOR THE  
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 03943 01 OF 03 252244Z

COVERING MEMORANDUM FROM THE MC CHAIRMAN POINTS TO SPECIFIC EARLY ACTIONS BY NATO IN THESE AREAS. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THIS MEMORANDUM WAS SIGNED AND FORWARDED TO THE SYG ON JULY 11. WE DO NOT YET KNOW WHAT ACTION, IF ANY, THE SYG

PLANS TO TAKE IN RESPONSE TO THE MEMORANDUM.

3. THE ENCLOSURE TO THIS MEMORANDUM IS THE IMS STUDY REFERENCED IN PARA 3 REF B. THE COMMUNICATIONS STUDY REPORTED IN PARA 4 REF C WAS AN ELEMENT OF THE OVERALL IMS STUDY.

4. PLEASE PROTECT CONTENT OF THIS MEMORANDUM AS WELL AS OUR POSSESSION OF IT.

5. BEGIN TEXT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

SUBJECT: COMMUNICATION AND OVERFLIGHTS IN THE SOUTHERN REGION

1. AS YOU RECALL I INDICATED IN THE DPC ON 15 MAY 1975, THAT A SMALL GROUP IN THE IMS HAD BEGUN A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF THE TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF THOSE ACTIONS PROPOSED BY AMBASSADOR ERLAP IN HIS STATEMENT TOT EH PDPC ON 25 APRIL 1975.

2. AT ENCLOSURE ARE THE INITIAL RESULTS OF THIS PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION, WHICH MAY PROVE HELPFUL IN REPLYING TO AMBASSADOR ERLAP'S REQUEST FOR URGENT ACTION ON HIS PROPOSALS.

3. THE FINDINGS OF THE IMS WHICH HAVE BEEN CO-ORDINATED WITH STAFF ELEMENTS OF SHAPE, ARE SUMMARISED BELOW AND ARE OUTLINED IN MORE DETAIL AT ENCLOSURE.

A. COMMUNICATIONS. THE PROPOSAL TO RE-ROUTE CERTAIN VOICE AND TELEGRAPH CIRCUITS VIA THE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE SYSTEM CANNOT BE MET WITHIN PRESENT CIRCUIT CAPACITY WITHOUT AN ADJUSTMENT OF PRIORITY. ADDITIONAL SATELLITE CIRCUIT CAPACITY COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE, BUT THERE WOULD THEN BE A REQUIREMENT FOR ADDITIONAL CIRCUITS BETWEEN THE USERS AND THE SATELLITE GROUND TERMINALS. ON AN EMERGENCY BASIS, THESE TERRESTRIAL LINKS COULD BE PROVIDED IN A MATTER OF HOURS. HOWEVER PERMANENT RE-ROUTING WOULD REQUIRE THE  
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 03943 01 OF 03 252244Z

RENTAL OF NE PTT CIRCUITS BETWEEN THE USERS AND THE SATELLITE GROUND TERMINALS.

B. REGIONAL AIR DEFENCE. THE LOSS OF THE GREEK PART OF NATO AIR DEFENCE GROUND ENVIRONMENT SYSTEM (NADGE) HAS CREATED A CONSIDERABLE GAP IN THE NATO RADAR COVERAGE BETWEEN ITALY AND TURKEY. A CONNECTION COULD BE ESTABLISHED AND MAINTAINED BETWEEN THE TURKISH PORTION AND THE REST OF THE NATO AIR DEFENCE SYSTEM. IN PARTICULAR THE SOC AT ESKISEHIR, TURKEY COULD BE LINKED TO THE SOC AT MARTINA FRANCA, ITALY AND THE CRC AT CANNAKALE, TURKEY COULD BE LINKED TO CRCS AT JACOTENENTE, ITALY AND OTRANTO, ITALY. THE RELOCATION OF NADGE FACILITIES IN GREECE IS NOT A FEASIBLE ALTERNATIVE.

C. OVERFLIGHTS. THE RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY THE HELLENIC AUTHORITIES HAVE CREATED SERIOUS PROBLEMS AFFECTING AIR DEFENCE AND EARLY WARNING ACTIVITIES, FREE TRANSIT OF TURKISH AIRCRAFT, AND THE EARLY WARNING ACTIVITIES, FREE TRANSIT OF TURKISH AIRCRAFT, AND THE CONDUCT OF NATO EXERCISES. FURTHERMORE THESE RESTRICTIONS COULD HAVE A PROFOUND IMPACT ON THE EXECUTION OF CONTINGENCY PLANS. THE ONLY SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM WOULD SEEM TO BE A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION TO THE ON-GOING GREEK-TURKISH NEGOTIATIONS ON OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS.

D. NATO EXERCISES. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT NATO'S SOLIDARITY AS AN ALLIANCE AND THE READINESS OF ITS ARMED FORCES BE APPARENT TO THE WARSAW PACT. THE WITHDRAWAL OR NON-PARTICIPATION OF MEMBER COUNTRIES IN NATO-WIDE EXERCISES HAS JUST THE OPPOSITE EFFECT. THEREFORE PARTICIPATION IN THE PLANNING AND IN THE ACTUAL EXERCISE PLAY

BY ALL ALLIANCE MEMBERS MUST BE ABSOLUTE. FORCES THAT CANNOT TRAIN AND

EXERCISE TOGETHER WILL HAVE EVEN MORE DIFFICULTIES FIGHTING TOGETHER. THE SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM WOULD AGAIN SEEM TO LIE SOLELY IN THE POLITICAL FIELD.

4. THE FINAL AREA CITED BY AMBASSADOR EARLY FOR ACTION WAS TO START WORK ON CONTINGENCY AND SUPPLEMENTARY PLANS, IN THE EVENT THAT GREECE ACTUALLY AND TOTALLY WITHDRAWS FROM NATO'S INTEGRATED MILITARY STRUCTURE. THIS AREA HAS NOT YET BEEN ADDRESSED BECAUSE AN EXAMINATION OF THIS COMPLEX MATTER WOULD INVOLVE CONSIDERABLE STAFF WORK, CLOSE LIAISON AND CONSULTATION WITH ALL WITH ALL APPROPRIATE LEVELS OF COMMAND AND OTHER NATIONS IN THE SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 03943 01 OF 03 252244Z

SOUTHERN REGION. IN ADDITION THE US PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE INDICATED IN HIS COMMENTS CIRCULATE TO THE DPC ON 15 MAY 1975 THAT IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE AT THIS TIME TO ASK THE MILITARY COMMITTEE TO DEVELOP CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR ALTERING EXISTING NATO PLANNING FOR THE SOUTHERN REGION. THE US FELT THAT GREECE'S FUTURE ROLE NEEDED TO BE DEFINED, AND TO INITIATE SUCH EFFORTS NOW WOULD TEND TO PREJUDICE THE OUTCOME OF THE GREECE/NATO DISCUSSIONS.

I DO NOT KNOW HOW YOU INTEND TO PROCEED WITH THE PROCESSING OF THESE SENSITIVE ISSUES, WHICH WILL OF COURSE BE A MATTER OF POLITICAL JUDGMENT.

P.J. HILL-NORTON  
ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET  
CHAIRMAN  
MILITARY COMMITTEE.

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PAGE 01 NATO 03943 02 OF 03 252346Z

73

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-03 INR-07 L-03 ACDA-05

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 USNATO 3943

#### IMS FINDINGS

#### COMMUNICATIONS

1. THE TURKISH AUTHORITIES REQUESTED THE DPC TO AUTHORISE THE MC TO INITIATE THE NECESSARY ACTION FOR RE-ROUTING THE FOLLOWING COMMUNICATIONS CIRCUITS VIA COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE:

##### A. VOICE CIRCUITS

- (1) SHAPE TO TURKISH GENERAL STAFF
- (2) AF SOUTH TO TURKISH GENERAL STAFF
- (3) COMNAVSOUTH TO TURKISH NAVY COMMAND
- (4) COMAIRSOUTH TO TURKISH AIR FORCE COMMAND

##### B. TELEGRAPH CIRCUITS

- (1) COMAISOUTH TO TURKISH AIR FORCE COMMAND (INCLUDING 2 WEATHER DATA CIRCUITS)
- (2) SHOC TO 1ST SOC ESKISEHIR (2 CIRCUITS)
- (3) SHOC TO 2ND SOC DIYARBAKIN (2 CIRCUITS)

2. THE SHAPE STAFF ADVISE THAT THE PROPOSAL CANNOT BE MET BY THE SATCOM CIRCUITS PRESENTLY AVAILABLE WITHOUT AN ADJUSTMENT OF SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 03943 02 OF 03 252346Z

PRIORITY. FURTHER SATCOM CAPACITY COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE BUT THERE WOULD BE A REQUIREMENT FOR ADDITIONAL LINKS BETWEEN USERS AND THE GROUND TERMINALS. A CONTINGENCY PLAN COULD BE PREPARED SO THAT THESE TERRESTRIAL LINKS COULD BE PROVIDED IN AN EMERGENCY IN ONLY A FEW HOURS. SHAPE STAFF FURTHER ADVISE THAT PERMANENT RE-ROUTING OF THE CIRCUITS VIA SATCOM WOULD ENTAIL THE RENTAL OF ADDITIONAL PTT CIRCUITS, AS EXPENDITURE THEY CONSIDER UNJUSTIFIED IN LIGHT OF THE EMERGENCY RE-ROUTING CAPABILITY PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED

AND THE FACT THAT THE ACE HIGH SYSTEM THROUGH BREECE CONTINUES TO FUNCTION NORMALLY AS DO ALSO NATO COMMUNICATIONS OVER PTT CIRCUITS THROUGH GREECE.

#### AIR DEFENSE

3. THE TURKISH AUTHORITIES REQUESTED THE DPC TO INVITE THE MC TO INITIATE THE NECESSARY ACTION TO CLOSE THE GAP BETWEEN THE 6ATAF AND 5ATAF AIR DEFENSE REGIONS, CREATED BY THE GREEKS' WITHDRAWAL FROM NATO AIR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES.

4. THE NATO AIR DEFENSE GROUND ENVIRONMENT (NADGE) COMPRISES NATIONAL RADARS AND ADDITIONAL COMMON FUNDED RADARS, COMPUTERS, COMMUNICATION, DATA TRANSMISSION AND DISPLAY SYSTEMS. TOGETHER WITH COMMON FUNDED EARLY WARNING RADARS THEY PROVIDE AN ESSENTIAL AIR PICTURE OF NATO AND ADJACENT AIRSPACE AND A WEAPON CONTROL CAPABILITY. THESE SYSTEMS HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED AS A WHOLE.

5. THE NADGE FACILITIES IN GREECE PRIOR TO JULY 1974 CONSISTED OF A SECTOR OPERATIONS CENTRE (SOC), THREE CONTROL AND REPORTING CENTRES (CRC), THREE EARLY WARNING RADAR SITES, ONE COASTAL RADAR, AND TWO MOBILE REPORTING POSTS(MRP). FIVE OF THESE SITES WERE AUTOMATED AND FIVE WERE MANUAL, THREE OF THE AUTOMATED SITES WERE FEEDING INFORMATION INTO ACE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM. THE LARISSA SOC EXERCISED TACTICAL CONTROL OF THESE UNITS WHICH WERE ASSIGNED TO SACEUR IN PEACETIME. THE LARISSA SOC REPORTED TO THE IZMIR, TURKEY AIR DEFENCE OPERATION CENTER (ADOC), WHICH IN TURN REPORTED TO THE REGIONAL AIR OPERATIONS CENTER (RAOC) AT NAPLES, ITALY.

6. THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE GREEK NADGE FACILITIES WOULD LEAVE A GAP OF APPROXIMATELY 200 NM IN RADAR COVERAGE, APPROXIMATELY 158  
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 03943 02 OF 03 252346Z

NM IS THAT AREA FACING BULGARIAN, YUGOSLAVIAN AND ALBANIAN TERRITORY. THE LOST COVERAGE OVER GREECE AND TO THE NORTH CANNOT BE IMMEDIATELY REPLACED AND RELAXATION OF FACILITIES IS NOT FEASIBLE. THE LOSS OF THIS COVERAGE ISOLATES THE AIR DEFENCE SYSTEM IN TURKEY TO THE EXTENT THAT SEA AND AIR BORNE REPORTING POSTS WOULD HAVE TO BE MAINTAINED AND NEW PROCEDURES AND ROUTING WOULD BE NECESSARY TO RESTORE THE AIR PICTURE DISSEMINATION OBTAINED FROM THE ISMIR, ADOC.

7. SHAPE STAFF AGREE THAT GREECE HAS CUT OFF THE SUPPLY OF EARLY WARNING INFORMATION TO NATO AND THAT TURKEY IS PRESENTLY ISOLATED FROM AN AIR DEFENCE POINT OF VIEW. THEY RECOMMEND THAT A CONNECTION BE ESTABLISHED AND MAINTAINED BETWEEN THE TURKISH AND NATO AIR DEFENCE SYSTEMS AS A MATTER OF PRIORITY, CERTAINLY BEFORE THE UNDERSEA CABLE BETWEEN SICILY AND TURKEY BECOMES OPERATIONAL (ESTIMATED LATE 1976). IT IS CONSIDERED IN PARTICULAR THAT THE SOC AT ESKISHIR, TURKEY SHOULD BE LINKED TO THE SOC AT MARTINA FRANCA, ITALY, AND THAT THE

CRC AT CANNAKALE, TURKEY SHOULD BE LINKED TO CRCS AT JACOTENENTE, ITALY AND OTRANTO, ITALY. PROVISION OF THE CIRCUITS BY SATCOM WOULD ENTAIL THE SAME IMPLICATIONS AS DISCUSSED UNDER COMMUNICATIONS. THE REQUIRED PTT LINKS BETWEEN USERS AND SATCOM TERMINALS WOULD ON INITIAL ROUGH ESTIMATES COST ABOUT 12 MILLION BF ANNUALLY. AN ALTERNATIVE CHEAPER METHOD SUGGESTED BY THE SHAPE STAFF MIGHT BE TO ESTABLISH THE REQUIRED LINKS VIA ACE HIGH FROM TURKEY TO CYPRUS, VIA UK DCN FROM CYPRUS TO THE UK, AND VIA ACE HIGH FROM THE UK TO ITALY. THIS ALTERNATIVE IS TECHNICALLY FEASIBLE.

OVERFLIGHTS.

8. THE TURKISH AUTHORITIES INVITED THE ALLIANCE TO ASSIST TURKEY IN RE-OPENING THE ATHENS FLIGHT INFORMATION REGION (FIR) TO AIR TRAFFIC.

9. IN JULY 1974, THE HELLENIC AUTHORITIES CEASED PASSING FLIGHT PLAN D INFORMATION AND RADAR CROSSTELL TO TURKISH AUTHORITIES FOR USE IN BOTH AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL AND FOR CORRELATION WITH RADAR EARLY WARNING. THE TURKISH AUTHORITIES PUBLISHED NOTICE TO AIRMAN (NOTAM)714 WHICH ESTABLISHED COMPULSORY REPORTING POINTS AT A DISTANCE SUFFICIENTLY REMOVED FROM THE  
SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 03943 02 OF 03 252346Z

TURKISH BORDER SO AS TO MAKE AIR DEFENSE FEASIBLE. THE GREEKS RESPONDED BY CLOSING THE AIR SPACE TO ESSENTIALLY ALL AIR TRAFFIC TRANSITING THE ATHENS FIR.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 03943 03 OF 03 252348Z

73  
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-03 INR-07 L-03 ACDA-05

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OC-05 CCO-00 OCL-00 /049 W  
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R 251915Z JUL 75  
FM USMISSION NATO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2892  
SECDEF WASHDC  
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AMEMBASSY ATHENS

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 USNATO 3943

10. THE CLOSURE OF AIR SPACE WITHIN THE ATHENS FIR MAKES IT NECESSARY FOR TURKISH AIRCRAFT FLYING WEST TO TAKE A LONGER SOUTHERN ROUTE OR A NORTHERN ROUTE OVER WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES. THE SOUTHERN ROUTE INCREASES THE COST OF TURKISH AIR OPERATIONS, WHILE THE NORTHERN ROUTE HAS THE POTENTIAL FOR CREATING INCIDENTS WITH BULGARIA OR YUGOSLAVIA. IN ADDITION THE DENIAL OF AIR SPACE IS A VERY SERIOUS IRRITANT AND ONE THAT COULD LEAD VERY QUICKLY TO REPRISAL ACTION AND/OR OPEN INCIDENTS. THE AIR SPACE PROBLEM ALSO SERIOUSLY IMPACTS UPON THE PLANNING AND CONDUCT OF NATO EXERCISES. FURTHERMORE THE IMPACT WOULD BE EVEN MORE SERIOUS IN TIMES OF CRISIS AND EMERGENCY, HAVING A MOST PROFOUND EFFECT ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF REINFORCEMENTS AND OPERATIONS IN THE AREA.

11. GREECE AND TURKEY RECENTLY BEGAN NEGOTIATIONS ON THE USE OF AIR SPACE WITH THE ATHENS FIR, AND IT IS IMPORTANT THAT NATIONS PROVIDE ALL SUPPORT NECESSARY TO ENCOURAGE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

#### NATO MILITARY EXERCISES

12. THE TURKISH AUTHORITIES REQUESTED THAT THE REASONS WHY THEY DID NOT TAKE PART IN WINTEX 75 SHOULD BE SET OUT, IN ORDER TO AVOID A SIMILAR OCCURRENCE IN FUTURE EXERCISES.

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 03943 03 OF 03 252348Z

13. THE WITHDRAWAL OF TURKEY FROM THE NATO-WIDE OPX, WINTEX 75 (MARCH 1975) WAS RELATED TO THEIR PROBLEMS WITH GREECE. TURKEY INDICATED THAT ITS WITHDRAWAL FROM THE EXERCISE WAS PREDICATED UPON EXERCISE ARTIFICIALITIES INVOLVING GREECE'S MILITARY WITHDRAWAL, CITING THAT THESE EXERCISE ARTIFICIALITIES IMPOSED TOO GREAT A BURDEN FOR MEANINGFUL EXERCISE PLAN.

14. NATO MILITARY EXERCISES PROVIDE AN ESSENTIAL TESTING GROUND FOR DETERMINATION OF THE ADEQUACY OF THE ALLIANCE'S CAPACITY FOR PERFORMING ITS DEFENSIVE MISSION. TO THIS END, MILITARY EXERCISES MUST BE AS REALISTIC AS POSSIBLE. WHILE IT IS FULLY APPRECIATED THAT CERTAIN ARTIFICIALITIES WILL ALWAYS BE PRESENT, BECAUSE WARTIME PRIORITIES CANNOT BE TOTALLY DUPLICATED IN EXERCISES,

EVERY EFFORT MUST BE EXPENDED TO PRECLUDE INTRODUCTION OF WHOLLY UNREALISTIC CONSTRAINTS ON MANOEUVRES AND EXERCISES. SCENARIOS SHOULD POSE PLAUSIBLE SITUATIONS AS BACKGROUND FOR REASONABLE MILITARY RESPONSES TO POSED STIMULI. TURKEY DID NOT BELIEVE WINTEX WAS SUFFICIENTLY REALISTIC BECAUSE OF PROBLEMS RAISED BY GREECE'S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE NATO INTEGRATED FORCE STRUCTURE AND THEIR SUBSEQUENT IMPOSED OVER-FLIGHT RESTRICTED AND NON - PARTICIPATION IN NATO AIR DEFENCE AND EARLY WARNING ACTIVITIES.

15. NATO MILITARY EXERCISES AFFORD MULTIPLE BENEFITS TO PARTICIPANTS. IN ADDITION TO THE IMMEDIATELY OBVIOUS MILITARY

BENEFITS OF TRAINING IN VARIOUS MILITARY SKILLS, THE POLITICAL FACETS ARE OF GREAT VALUE. BY AND THROUGH THE MULTINATIONAL CO-ORDINATION EFFORTS, THE SOLIDARITY OF THE ALLIANCE AND ITS CAPACITY FOR MUTUAL PROTECTION OF PARTICIPANTS ARE DEMONSTRATED TO ANY POTENTIAL ENEMY. THE IMPLICATIONS OF ABSENCE OF SOLIDARITY ARE OBVIOUS.

16. MILITARY EXERCISES, TO BE EFFECTIVE, REQUIRE EXTENSIVE AND DETAILED STAFF PLANNING, WHICH FREQUENTLY OCCUPIES MONTHS AND MONTHS OF EFFORT. IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE MILITARY EXERCISES ARE SUBJECT TO CANCELLATION OR MAJOR MODIFICATION LATE IN THIS PLANNING CYCLE, MUCH OF THE STAFF WORK IS WASTED. INsofar AS IS PRACTICABLE, MILITARY EXERCISES SHOULD  
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 03943 03 OF 03 252348Z

BE DESIGNED TO ACCOMPLISH SPECIFIC AIMS AND OBJECTIVES, AND ONCE THESE ARE DETERMINED, THEY SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT.

17. THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE SOUTHWESTERN REGION POSES SERIOUS PROBLEMS FOR NATO MILITARY EXERCISE PLANNERS. AMONG THESE PROBLEMS ARE:

- A. UNCERTAINTY OF PARTICIPATION IN SCHEDULED EXERCISES BY EITHER HELLENIC, TURKISH, OR BOTH FORCES;
  - B. MAJOR MODIFICATIONS IN SCOPE, OR MAGNITUDE, OF EXERCISES TO ACCOMMODATE WITHDRAWAL OR ABSENCE OF PARTICIPATION BY HELLENIC, TURKISH, OR BOTH FORCES;
  - C. THE DENIAL TO NATO MILITARY FORCES AND NATO NATIONAL FORCES OF ACCESS RIGHTS THROUGH NATIONAL WATERS AND AIR SPACE.
- PROBLEMS SUCH AS THOSE CITED ABOVE, RESULT IN THE LOSS TO PARTICIPANTS

OF EXERCISE EXPERIENCE AND REQUIRE MAJOR MODIFICATIONS TO EXERCISES WHICH SUBSTANTIALLY DEFEAT THE PURPOSE OF THE PROGRAMME. SUCH ACTIVITIES ADVERSELY AFFECT THE COMBAT READINESS OF NATIONAL AND NATO FORCES. COMBAT READINESS IS DIRECTLY PROPORTIONAL TO THE ADEQUACY AND FREQUENCY OF TRAINING. PROTECTION OF EXPOSED FLANKS OF THE ALLIANCE REQUIRES A CAPABILITY TO REINFORCE RAPIDLY. DENIAL OF DIRECT TRANSIT ROUTES TO THE FLANK EXTREMEITIES COULD DELAY ARRIVAL OF ESSENTIAL REINFORCEMENTS WITH ATTENDANT SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS. WHEN ARTIFICIAL RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED ON TRAINING IN THE SOUTHERN REGION, THE COMBAT READINESS AND COMBAT CAPABILITY OF THE ALLIANCE TO DEFEND ITS SOUTHERN FLANK IS IN JEOPARDY.

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## Message Attributes

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**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** n/a  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 25 JUL 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** GolinoFR  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975NATO03943  
**Document Source:** ADS  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** 11652 GDS  
**Errors:** n/a  
**Film Number:** n/a  
**From:** NATO  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
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**Office:** n/a  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
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**Page Count:** 8  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** A. STATE 171726 B. USNATO 3051 C. USNATO 3238  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** GolinoFR  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 30 APR 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <30 APR 2003 by MartinML>; APPROVED <01 MAY 2003 by GolinoFR>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
06 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** IMS STUDY OF TURKISH CONCERNS : COMMUNICATIONS, AIR DEFENSE, OVERFLIGHTS, EXERCISES  
**TAGS:** PFOR, NATO, 57  
**To:** STATE  
SECDEF INFO ANKARA  
ATHENS  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006